منابع تحقیق درباره Persian Gulf، Saudi Arabia، interest، the Middle East
Defense, Mc Namara in June 1968:
We can anticipate that the small states and sheikhdoms of the Gulf will rather naturally look to us to take the place of the British, and that it is easier to avoid this temptation at the outset than it would be late to attempt to extricate ourselves. (J. R. Macris, 2010, p. 173)
In this regard, President Jonson’s administration policy (1963-1969) toward the Persian Gulf at that time (January 1968) concentrated on six key themes: first, the US must not replace Britain as the security guarantor in the Persian Gulf region with the U.S. military because of the Vietnam struggle and other cold war commitments. Second, keeping the British engaged in the region as long as possible (J. R. Macris, 2010). Third, the U.S. would rely on security groupings of nations in the region to fill the vacuum in the Persian Gulf (Hedrick, 1968, p. 3). Fourth, build up the Twin Pillars of Iran and Saudi Arabia as the policemen in the region. Fifth, the U.S. should maintain the size of its naval presence in the Persian Gulf region. Sixth, to keep a watchful eye on the Soviet Union because Americans feared that communist designs would spread with the departure of the British.
Also within days of Britain’s withdrawal announcement, Walt Rostow, one of the important idea men in the Johnson administration envisioned that the US should rely on “security groupings of nations in the region” to fill the vacuum in the Persian Gulf (J. R. Macris, 2010, p. 174). Rostow’s idea was like a NATO concept of collective security for the Persian Gulf with some type of enlarged role for the United States. Rostow discussed his views concerning a “multi-national regional security pact”, one that might include “American leadership”, or even the use of “American military trainers to assist Arab states”. But the reaction to Rostow’s idea was condemned by the Soviet Union and some nations in the Arab world because they saw this idea as colonial occupancy by the U.S.
۳.۷ The policy of Twin pillar by Nixon administration
Full awareness of the “Twin Pillar policy” or “Nixon Doctrine” or also “Nixon-Kissinger Doctrine” was formulated by the Nixon administration before the Islamic Revolution in Iran. The British announcement of withdrawing from the Persian Gulf by 1971 gave a shock to the U.S., because the communist penetration in the region was the main concern of the United States and it was important to fill that security gap for the security of the Persian Gulf region. Due to its engagement in the Vietnam War and also the belief that “a colonial presence in the region would encourage anti-western sentiments and contribute to the overthrow of the conservative pro-western regimes” (Mojtahed-Zadeh, 1990, p. 5), pushed the U.S. to prefer an indirect strategy for security of the Persian Gulf area. So, the U.S. preferred that the pro-western regional countries of the Persian Gulf should take the security responsibility for the region. The Nixon Doctrine on 18 February 1970 clearly stated:
The United States will participate in the defense and development of allies and friends, but America- cannot and will not-conceive all the plans, design all the programs, execute all the decisions and undertake all the defense of the free nations of the world. We will help where it makes a real difference and is considered in our interest (Ferrell, 1975, pp. 812-813).
According to the Nixon Doctrine, monarchies of Iran and Saudi Arabia were expected to act as U.S. alliances in the Persian Gulf region. Pahlavi’s regime in Iran and the Al-e-Saud regime in Saudi Arabia both were empowered to guarantee regional stability in the Persian Gulf for the free flow of oil to the United States and its western allies in western Europe (Potter & Sick, 2002, p. 23). Iran was regarded as being militarily more capable of securing Western interests and politically more stable than Saudi Arabia.
At the beginning, the Shah announced his willingness to work with Saudi Arabia for the security of the Persian Gulf states, but Saudi Arabia refused to support Iran’s proposal mainly for reasons of the following parameters: 1) Iran’s claim on Bahrain and three other small islands – Abu Mousa, leaser and great Tunbs – in the Persian Gulf; 2) Iran’s pro- western and pro-Israeli policies and its membership in the CENTO (Central Treaty Organization); 3) conflict between Iran and Iraq and exclusionof Iraq from the pact (Ghassemi, p. 185). So during the Shah’s official visit to Washington, on October 21, 1969, President Nixon told him that the United States hoped Iran would become the dominant power in the Persian Gulf. The formal US-Iranian cooperation in the Persian Gulf was established in May, 1972 when President Nixon and his national security advisor, Henry Kissinger, visited the Shah in Iran and agreed on a security arrangement with Iran playing the main role in protecting western interests in the Persian Gulf.
Some reasons for the priority of Iran as the regional gendarme of western powers were: 1) Iran had a key role in the cold war alliances to contain Soviet influence; 2) Iran had a strategic location; 3) Iran had the largest population in the Persian Gulf; 3) from a military point of view Iran was the most powerful state in the Persian Gulf; 4) Shah Pahlavi’s regime had the readiness potential to assume such a role in the region; 5) Iran had friendly relations with the Israeli regime in the Middle East region, which was the alliance of U.S. and European countries and was also the red line of western policies in the region, provided that the Arab-Israeli relations in that period of time were at their worst and the Arab oil embargoes in 1973 were aimed at the western economy.
Regarding the above mentioned reasons for choosing Iran as a regional gendarme, Joseph Sisco, Assistant secretary of State, in a statement before the House Subcommittee on the Near East said:
Iran by virtue of its population, its economic and military strength and its geographic position along the northern shore of the Persian Gulf, is destined to play a major role in providing for stability in the [Persian] Gulf and the continued flow of oil to consumer countries. Fortunately, Iran has both the will and the capability to do so. (US-House, 1972, p. 84)
Also, Henry Kissinger in this case believed that there was no justification for America to send its military forces to the Persian Gulf in the midst of the Vietnam War. Then he mentioned that:
the vacuum left by British withdrawal, now menaced by Soviet intrusion and radical momentum, would be filled by a local power friendly to us… and all of this was achievable without any American resources, since the shah was willing to pay for the equipment out of his oil revenues (Kissinger, 1979, p. 1264).
The shah was thus given almost unlimited access to the most sophisticated U.S. weaponry and gradually came to be regarded as the “policeman of the Persian Gulf” (Bahgat, p. 5). To attain this goal, Iran’s military might was reinforced by building a number of military bases in the region and outside the Persian Gulf region in the Indian Ocean. The United States, according to its aims, especially responded to the requests of the Pahlavi monarchy regime in Iran for sophisticated military hardware and training assistance and provided Iran with several kinds of advanced weapons.
Henry Kissinger (1979) described the special relation between Iran and US as the parallel policies of these two countries:
on all major international issues, the policies of the United states and the policies of Iran have been parallel and therefore mutually reinforcing … Iran has never gone to war or threatened to go to war for any purpose which would not have been parallel to our own … Not out of sentimentality … but out of a calculation of our own national and global interests, just as Iranian policy is based on its calculation of its national interests, there has developed a parallelism of views on many key problems that has made our cooperation a matter that is in the profound national interests of both countries.
The Nixon- Kissinger Doctrine appeared to be developing a regional security policy aimed at excluding Iraq, because after the 1968 Coup against the monarchy regime, the new pan-Arab regime in Baghdad that advocated Arab nationalist goals had socialistic tendencies toward the Soviet Union. To this end, the Nixon Doctrine advocated reliance on Iran and, to a much lesser extent, on Saudi Arabia to maintain security in the Persian Gulf. These developments were viewed with much suspicion by Iraq, which envisaged them as serious challenges to its own interests and ambitions in the Persian Gulf and this was one of the main reasons for Saddam Hussein’s invasion in 1980 of Iran after the Islamic Revolution (Ghareeb, 1990, p. 27).
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