پایان نامه ارشد درباره interest، Persian Gulf، Saudi Arabia، the Middle East

international anarchy conditioned regional states to endlessly seek to balance each other in the attempt to maintain security. Yet, he failed to note how their alignment behavior was designed to counter internal as well as external threats. In fairness to Walt, he did show awareness of how non-military factors seemed to shape regional states’ alliance behaviors (Walt 1987: 149).
Kraig defines what is meant by “regional security” He offers the following definition of regional security:” a situation in which the financial and human capital of nations is used primarily for social, political, economic and spiritual development, rather than for military and security (Kraig, 2004).
Another concept that will be examined in this study is Collective Security. It is supposed that Collective Security approach is an ideal security system for the Persian Gulf region. The concept of collective security may be defined as general cooperative action for the maintenance and enforcement of international peace. The concept of collective security: First, it assumes that each state is interested, to varying degrees, in the occurrence of interstate conflict and in methods employed in the settlement of international disputes. Secondly, the notion of a “general cooperative action” means that a collective security system is incompatible with the doctrine of self-help as a basis for international organizations. Thirdly, in order to preserve or re-establish peace, collective action, whenever necessary, can be undertaken. Fourthly, “general cooperative action” also implies that the vast majority of states in the collective security system must unite against the aggressor country (Tarzi, 1997).
There are three fundamental tenets for collective security system: First, it is a system of cooperation among states such that an act of aggression by one of its members is an act of aggression against all of its members. As defined in the 1930s, the meaning is “the safety of all by all.” Secondly, enforcement must have a degree of automaticity among the members of the collective security system. Members of the system must “be willing and able at all times to muster overwhelming strength for collective defense at successive points of conflict. A third element is some level of commitment to the status quo that is to say, the members of the system are states, and the vast majority (at least) of such states regard as sufficiently equitable their boundaries and other relationships (for example, trade), so that preponderant force can be mobilized to deter, or reverse, an act of aggression (Clark, 1995).
The fundamental structural principle of a Collective Security System can be illustrated with the axiom “one for all and all for one”. As a legal expression, this characterizes “Collective Security” as a system in which (1) nations commit themselves to the mutual and automatic securing of peace; (2) the protective function is independent of whether the aggressor is a member or not; and (3) the security system is never directed at a specific potential aggressor or aggressors. Common Security does not have “only” the long-term aim of replacing pacts and blocs as well as establishing a system of Collective Security (Lutz, 1984).
The model of collective security assumes that each member of international society be prepared to see an aggression anywhere as a threat to the peace and to view an attack on one as an attack on all. Peace, in other words, must be seen as indivisible. In addition, the model assumes that states are prepared to act decisively on this recognition even if such action is costly and goes against their more immediate short-term interests. Whether or not a state responded to a particular act of aggression would be determined by the overall pattern of its foreign policy interests (Hurrell, 1992).
Robert D. Murphy (1995) believes that Collective Security needs some implications as follows: First, Working partnerships; second, long-term basis – collective security policies are not designed to meet an emergency situation-. Third, Costs – we must accept the fact that our collective-security policies cost a great deal of money and probably will continue to be costly for a long period of years. Fourth, Requirements of leadership – the requirements of leadership are complex and strenuous, and the essential requirement is a profound understanding of the obligations of partnership. Fifth, not to destroy – the path of collective security involves many difficulties (Murphy, 1955).
Many scholars have criticized to collective security approach. Clark describes the principal criticisms of collective security as: 1) the very rebirth of enthusiasm for collective security leads to the suspicion that the conditions that make it now seem possible (peace – absence of a threat) will lead to its demise when inevitably the conditions change. 2) The universality and automaticity of the commitments of collective security will not be matched by members’ actions. 3) The timing of the response: Collective Security is likely to delay reaction to attack, because the members of the system must react, mobilize, and coordinate their response ad hoc. 4) The emphasis on multilateralism in the theory of collective security denigrates the value of unilateralism. 5) Because collective security envisions an automatic, multilateral response, such a response may actually turn minor wars into major ones (Clark, 1995).
Although the idea of collective security has had a curious history and we have been unable either to accept it or to acknowledge our abandonment of it. We reject and repudiate it in practice but persist in coddling it in theory. The advocacy for collective security remains strong and despite the problems with the theory of collective security, and, more specifically, the problems with the practice of peacekeeping, the U.S. continues to favor multilateral approaches to the problem of security.
۲.۳ Evolving of the Persian Gulf Security Regimes
During the 20th century, the Persian Gulf seems to have gone through at least three distinctly different security regimes, including Pax Britannica, Pax Saudi-Iranica, and Pax Americana. Pax Britannica lasted from 1918, the conclusion of World War I, to 1971, which marked the withdrawal of British forces from the East of the Suez (Tehranian, 2003).
The era of Pax Britannica came to an end with the postwar dismemberment of the British Empire and the rise of nationalist regimes in Iran, Iraq, Syria, Palestine/Israel, and Egypt. A new era emerged in 1971 when the British forces were withdrawn from the East of the Suez. Under the circumstances, Pax Americana could have effectively replaced Pax Britannica. However, the United States’ withdrawal from Vietnam had led to the emergence of the Nixon Doctrine calling for the establishment of proxy powers in various regions of the world to act on behalf of the United States’ interests. In the Persian Gulf, the monarchist regimes of Saudi Arabia and Iran presented themselves as candidates for this role (Tehranian, 2003)
In the 1970s, the Nixon-Kissinger’s Doctrine transformed the Shah’s status from that of a protected client to that of a regional partner of the United States. Washington’s geopolitical design – related to the Nixon -Kissinger Doctrine – created a new constellation of pro-American powers in the Middle East and Southern Africa (Falk, 1979). Falk posits that there were three principal reasons for this shift. First, Soviet influence was perceived to be expanding in the area which contains the world’s largest and most accessible mineral and oil resources. Secondly, the national liberation movements, whose success was presumed to be inimical to western interests, were seen as gaining momentum. Thirdly, revitalization of American power in this region was needed to neutralize the growing American economic failure to maintain its competitive position in the world system vis-a-vis either Japan or Western Europe (1979; 45).
Marz (1997) agrees with the first reason and adds two other different reasons for Dual Containment: “A second determining factor is the political outcome of Desert Storm. Although the war was a clear military victory for the coalition forces, its political aftermath is considered a failure by many observers because Saddam Hussein remains in power. The third factor was the Arab-Israeli peace process. Both Iran and Iraq have well-documented ties to subversive elements that are opposed to the peace process” (M. J. L. Mraz, 1997).
The Islamic revolution of 1979 in Iran brought Pax Saudi-Iranica to an end and then with the support of Saudi Arabia, Kuwait, as well as Western powers, Iraq invaded Iran in 1980. The consequence was an eight-year war in which both sides incurred incalculable material and human costs (Tehranian, 5). After the brokered ceasefire

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